Can Program Explanations Save the Causal Efficacy of Beliefs? by Walter, Sven
  360 
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Sven Walter, Saarbrücken 
Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit offered the “program 
explanation account” (PEA) in order to vindicate the causal 
relevance of mental states such as beliefs. According to 
J&P, a property F of a cause-event c (potentially a mental 
property) can be causally relevant for an effect-event e’s 
having property G because “e had G because c had F” is 
an informative, non-redundant program explanation. If 
PEA succeeded, the causal relevance of beliefs would be 
vindicated and mental property epiphenomenalism would 
be avoided.1 However, it doesn’t succeed. 
A “program explanation identifies a condition such that 
its realization is enough to ensure that there will be causes 
to produce the event explained” (J&P 1992, 119). Since 
the instantiation of a mental property M ensures the 
instantiation of a physical property P, an explanation of e’s 
having G in terms of M (“e had G because c had M”) is 
informative and M’s instantiation programs for the exis-
tence of a property, P, with causal powers suitable to bring 
about e’s having G. 
The realization of [M] ensures … that a crucial produc-
tive property is realized and … that the [effect] event … 
occurs. [M] does not figure in the productive process 
leading to the event but it more or less ensures that a 
property-instance which is required for that process does 
figure. … [I]ts realization programs for the appearance of 
the productive property and … for the event produced. 
(J&P 1990a, 114) 
Suppose the temperature of the water in a closed flask is 
raised until the flask cracks. The salient program explana-
tion is “The flask shattered because the temperature of the 
water reached boiling point”. The rise of the temperature 
did not itself cause the shattering, which was caused by 
the impact of molecules on the walls of the flask. Still, we 
“properly count citing the increase in temperature as 
explaining the shattering, for the increase programmes the 
shattering” (J&P 1988, 395). Therefore, although what is 
causally relevant is the impact of molecules, the increase 
in temperature is still causally relevantJP, and this is 
enough, J&P claim, to reject mental property epiphenome-
nalism. 
This suggests the following notion of causal relevanceJP: 
Definition 1: c’s having F is causally relevantJP for e’s 
having G iff (i) c’s having F is causally relevant for e’s 
having G, or (ii) c’s having F is causally irrelevant for e’s 
having G but ensures the instantiation of a property H of 
c, distinct from F, such that c’s having H is causally 
relevant for e’s having G. 
But D1 is too weak. Suppose Hannah’s aluminum ladder 
touches an electric wire and Hannah dies. The ladder has 
the dispositional property of being a good thermal 
conductor, which supervenes upon its categorical basis, a 
property of the cloud of free electrons that permeates the 
metal. The ladder’s being a good thermal conductor thus 
                                                     
1
 J&P distinguish between causally efficacious properties (properties doing 
‘real’ causal work) and causally relevant properties (properties which are either 
causally efficacious, or causally inefficacious but figure in program explana-
tions). I will use ‘causal relevance’ instead of J&P’s ‘causal efficacy’, and 
‘causal relevanceJP’ instead of their ‘causal relevance’. J&P claim, then, that a 
causally irrelevant mental property may nevertheless be causally relevantJP 
and that this suffices to avoid mental property epiphenomenalism. 
ensures the instantiation of a property (the categorical 
basis), which is causally relevant for Hannah’s dying, but 
the ladder’s being a good thermal conductor was certainly 
not relevant for Hannah’s dying. 
If one lower-level property is the categorical basis of two 
distinct dispositional properties (like being a good thermal 
conductor and being a good electrical conductor), ensuring 
the presence of a causally relevant lower-level property is 
not sufficient for causal relevanceJP. 
One might want to add that F, in addition to ensuring the 
presence of a causally relevant property, must figure in an 
informative program explanation. The result would be: 
Definition 2: c’s having F is causally relevantJP for e’s 
having G iff (i) c’s having F is causally relevant for e’s 
having G, or (ii) c’s having F is causally irrelevant for e’s 
having G but ensures the instantiation of a property H of 
c, distinct from F, such that c’s having H is causally 
relevant for e’s having G and “e is G because c was F” is 
an informative program explanation. 
The above counterexample can then be avoided since 
“Hannah died because her ladder was a good electrical 
conductor” is an informative program explanation, while 
“Hannah died because her ladder was a good thermal 
conductor” is not. But why is the former, in contrast to the 
latter, an informative program explanation? 
Here’s a test of significance for any program explana-
tion. Suppose that we have a program explanation of an 
event e by reference to an antecedent P, and that P 
explains e because its realization effectively ensures that 
some factor of type F occurs. Imagine now that we identify 
the F-factor in operation. A useful test for the significance 
of the original program explanation is to ask whether it 
offers any information not available, at least under ordinary 
assumptions, to someone possessed of the F-explanation. 
(J&P 1992, 124; italics S.W.) 
But this test remains silent about why “Hannah died 
because her ladder is a good electrical conductor” is an 
informative program explanation but “Hannah died 
because her ladder is a good thermal conductor” is not. 
Explanations in terms of the thermal conductivity of 
Hannah’s ladder certainly provide information not available 
to someone possessed solely of explanations in terms of 
clouds of free electrons. “Hannah died because her ladder 
is a good thermal conductor” is an informative program 
explanation, according to J&P’s test. 
It will not do to argue that “Hannah died because her 
ladder is a good electrical conductor” is informative 
because it mentions a property relevant to Hannah’s dying. 
This would be tantamount to saying that those program 
explanations are informative that appeal to relevant 
properties, and obviously the attempt to ground the 
informativeness of program explanations in their appeal to 
relevant properties is hopeless if the causal relevanceJP of 
a property is supposed to be grounded in its aptness to 
figure in informative program explanations. 
Adding to D2 the requirement that the property in 
question figures in an informative program explanation 
does not lead anywhere, unless we can specify which 
program explanations are informative. 
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In another paper, J&P have offered an account based on 
the idea of what they have called “invariance of effect 
under variation of realization” (J&P 1990b, 202).  
We can express the basic idea behind a program 
explanation in terms of what remains constant under 
variation. Suppose state a caused state b. Variations on a, 
say, a’, a’’, … would have caused variations on b, say b’, 
b’’, …, respectively. It may be that if the ai share a property 
P, the bi would share a property Q: keep P constant 
among the actual and possible causes, and Q remains 
constant among the actual and possible effects. If you like, 
Q tracks P. Our point is that in such a case P causally 
explains Q by programming it, even though it may be that 
P does not produce Q. (J&P 1988, 394) 
The idea underlying this relatively abstract formulation is 
simple. In cases of informative program explanations, the 
same effect (e.g. the shattering of the flask) would, in 
different possible situations, have been produced by 
different lower-level realizers of the higher-level property 
cited in the program explanation. This higher-level property 
is the property in common to all those possible situations, 
in each of which the effect would have been produced by a 
realizer and in one of which it has actually been produced. 
If any of the realizers of the property cited in the program 
explanation, the actual one as well as the possible ones, 
would have brought about the effect – if there is invariance 
of effect under variation of realization – then this property 
is causally relevantJP.2 If, however, there are realizers of 
the higher-level property that fail to bring about the effect – 
if there is variance of effect under variation of realization – 
then this property is causally irrelevantJP. This is why 
Hannah’s ladder’s being a good electrical conductor differs 
from its being a good thermal conductor (or its opacity, 
which is J&P’s example): 
The reason being a good conductor of electricity is 
causally relevant to [Hannah’s] death is that it did not 
matter … what the categorical basis of that disposition 
was, for provided the causal role definitive of good 
electrical conductivity was occupied by a state of the 
ladder she would have died. … And, of course, the reason 
opacity, say, is not causally relevant to her dying is that it 
might easily have been realized without her dying – as 
would, for instance, have been the case had the ladder 
been wooden. (J&P 1990b, 205) 
The notion of causal relevanceJP based on the idea of 
“invariance of effect under variation of realization” can be 
captured as follows: 
Definition 3: c’s having F is causally relevantJP for e’s 
having G iff for any property P of c such that P realizes 
F, if c has P in some world w, then c’s having P is 
causally relevant in w to e’s having G. 
Yet, D3 is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal 
relevanceJP. 
To see how the above example can be modified to yield 
a counterexample to D3, note that the causal irrelevanceJP 
of thermal conductivity was due to there being realizers of 
thermal conductivity that are not causally relevant for 
Hannah’s dying, namely those that do not in addition 
realize electrical conductivity. The existence of those 
realizers is responsible for the variance of effect in the 
case of thermal conductivity. This shows that all we need 
is a causally relevantJP property F and a causally irrele-
                                                     
2
 Given that the counterexample to D1 was based upon the fact that all that 
mattered was the presence of the actual realizer, taking into account other 
possible realizers naturally suggests itself. 
vantJP property H, such that H has no realizers that are not 
also realizers of F: In this case, if F is causally relevantJP to 
e’s being G according to D3, then all realizers of F will 
bring about e’s being G, but so will all realizers of H, 
because the latter are just a subset of the former. Hence, 
any property H for which ∀R (R ∈ ΠH ⊃ R ∈ ΠF) will also 
be causally relevantJP to e’s being G (where “R ∈ ΠH” 
means “R is a realizer of H” and the necessity operator ‘’ 
has whatever modal force is operative in our definition of 
realization).3 Thus, we need an example such that: 
(a) c’s being F is causally relevantJP to e’s being G; 
(b) c’s being H is causally irrelevantJP for e’s being G;  
(c)  ∀R (R ∈ ΠH ⊃ R ∈ ΠF) and  
(d) H ∉ ΠF. 
Suppose the worlds relevant to the notion of realization are 
the nomologically possible worlds. Then ∀R (R ∈ ΠH ⊃ R 
∈ ΠF) means that ΠH ⊂ ΠF in all nomologically possible 
worlds. Examples of properties F and H such that H does 
not realize F and ΠH ⊂ ΠF in all nomologically possible 
worlds are easy to find since nomological dependence 
between properties is weaker than realization. Suppose a 
strict law of the form “all Hs are Fs” connects H and F. This 
does not entail that H realizes F. There may be a signifi-
cant ontological independence between the instantiation of 
H and F, and we might not think of H as constituting F or 
as amounting to F, as we would in the case of realization. 
Nevertheless, if all Hs are Fs, ΠH ⊂ ΠF. And of course 
there is nothing incoherent in the claim that H and F are 
connected by a strict law and yet c’s having F is causally 
relevantJP for an effect while c’s having H is not. 
Assume it is a strict law that all planets move on circular 
orbits. There is no reason why being a planet should be 
thought of as a realizer of moving on a circular orbit. 
Suppose Hannah has to prepare a list of all objects which 
have trajectories through space congruent with the ancient 
Greek’s favorite geometrical figure. Hannah includes Pluto 
on her list. According to D3 Pluto’s being a planet is 
causally relevantJP for its being included, since any way of 
realizing the former (within the range of nomologically 
possible worlds) would have resulted in the latter. But 
Pluto’s being a planet is in no sense relevant to its ending 
up on Hannah’s list; it does not matter whether Pluto is a 
planet. Had it been a spaceship or a satellite it would have 
been on the list as well. 
This shows that D3 and with it J&P’s last attempt to 
ground PEA fails, since D3 is not sufficient for causal 
relevanceJP. Moreover, D3 is not even necessary for 
causal relevanceJP. 
Any account of the causal relevance of irreducible 
mental properties must account for Fred’s desire’s being a 
desire for beer being causally relevant to Fred’s going to 
the fridge to get some beer, since no one can seriously 
accept that Fred’s desire’s being a desire for beer is 
causally irrelevantJP. Nevertheless, there are circum-
stances where D3 renders being a desire for beer causally 
irrelevantJP. Suppose Fred has desire for beer, and he 
knows that there is some Corona in the fridge, some 
Canadian Dry in the basement and some Budweiser in his 
study. There is no invariation of effect under variation of 
realization: not any realizer of being a desire for beer will 
                                                     
3
 This abstract remark captures a straightforward idea: if F is causally rele-
vantJP because each of its realizers is causally relevant to e’s having G, then 
the instantiation of any property H such that ΠH ⊂ ΠF will also entail the pres-
ence of a realizer property that is causally relevant for e’s having G. 
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eventuate in Fred’s trip to the fridge. Some realizers of 
being a desire for beer will cause Fred to go into the 
basement or his study. Being a desire for beer does not 
satisfy D3 and hence fails to be causally relevantJP, which I 
take to be an intolerable consequence, close to a reductio 
of D3. 
J&P’s attempts to define a weaker notion of causal 
relevanceJP that can be attributed to mental properties 
even if the only causally relevant properties are their 
physical realizers fails. If mental property epiphenomenal-
ism is false, it cannot be because PEA is true. 
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